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I.
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
1. The challenge of enabling Mozambique's international frontier crossing
desplacados (refugees) to return home has six basic aspects:
a. no programme can be mounted and no encouragement to return given 
until the drought is broken. Return during a drought crisis is
likely to end at best in retreat and at worst in death. To
encourage it is to be a party to negligent homicide;
b. but if the 1992/93 rains, and therefore the 1993 main crops, are
good, and the security situation is even modestly improved in Tete 
and Zambesia massive returns (whether organised and supported or 
otherwise) should and will take place over March-September 1993. 
(Later returns than September are dangerous to the returnee because 
there will rarely be time to clear bush and plant for the main 
rains and the subsequent year's main crop.);
c. the total number of refugees is of the order of 215,000 households
(1,500,000 persons) of whom almost two thirds are in Malawi;
d. therefore return in one year cannot be supported;
e. virtually all present refugees are from rural homes (urban refugees
from Tete and Zambesia have, in general, returned with UNHCR help) 
and fragmentary inquiries suggest that most desire to return to 
their home districts;
2f. the frontier crossing desplacados (refugees) are part of a total of 
1,000,000 households (7,000,000 persons) who have had their 
livelihoods wiped out by war and need assistance for livelihood 
rehabilitation.
2. Therefore the livelihood rehabilitation strategy for returnados 
(returning refugees) needs to be part of a broader Rehabilitacao 
strategy for all rural households economically wiped out by war. In 
Reconstrucao: The Road From Emergencia to Developmento such a 
strategy, including Refugees, is mapped. The one special feature of 
refugee households from this perspective is the longer average distance 
back to their homes - and even that does not hold true of those from 
border districts in Zambesia and, especially, Tete now in border 
districts in Malawi.
3. Operationally refugees have a special international supporting agency 
UNHCR which is committed to initial re-establishment support as well to 
facilitating return. However, that opportunity comes with three 
special challenges to overcome:
a. UNHCR - especially in Africa - has never handled a return programme 
of more than about a sixth the size of the one for Mozambique's 
refugees and its two largest programmes in the region (Zimbabwe and 
Namibia) were to far less physically war ravaged countries;
b. UNHCR has always run free standing programmes not collaborated in 
overall rehabilitation strategies designed and led by the 
government of the refugees' home state;
c. UNHCR's support after return has almost always been relatively 
short term (6 to 12 months) and concentrated on consumption not on 
livelihood reconstruction more broadly.
4. Other international agencies (notably UNDP, WFP, UNICEF) are very 
interested in return and also in more general support to refugees, 
displaced and affected households and those pauperised in place.
However, each has rather different approaches and in general see 
refugees as a distinct category. The complexity - and potential for 
chaos is compounded when bilateral and external NGO operations and 
intentions are brought into the picture.
35. To achieve a coherent and effective Return programme within a
Reconstrucao framework., Mozambique needs:
a. to decide on and to articulate its own strategy;
b. to hold dialogue with international agencies, bilateral donors (and
the largest external NGOs) to secure acceptance of Mozambique's 
strategy;
c. to negotiate an agreed pattern of UNHCR participation in
Reconstrucao consistent with UNHCR's mandate and the reality that 
after return home refugees are 20% of the households needing 
similar assistance and neither can be nor desire to be grouped in
special Returnado Districts or settlements;
d. Similarly the overall Rehabilitacao/Reconstrucao financial 
mobilisation proposals needs to go to 1992 Consultative group to 
allow initial operations with/in in support of households by March 
1993 (assuming the drought is not repeated). However, donors (e.g. 
Japan) and agencies (notably UNHCR) should be assisted in stressing 
their returnado support concerns in their financial support so long 
as this can be accommodated with coherence of the overall Refugee- 
Displaced Person-Affected Person-Pauperised in Place Person- 
Demobilised Person livelihood rehabilitation enabling strategy.
II.
THE SITUATION
6. A reasonable estimate of the number of cross frontier desplacaders
(refugees) who, given an opportunity to re-establish themselves, will
wish to return home is 1,500,000;
■ Malawi - 950,000 (Tete, Zambesia, Niassa, Sofala)
■ Tanzania - 75,000 (Niassa, Cabo Delgado)
■ Zambia - 75,000 (Tete)
Z imbabwe -  100,000 (Manica, Inhambane, Gaza)
4■ Swaziland - 25,000 (Maputo, Gaza)
■ South Africa - 275,000 (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane)
7. These figures are very imprecise as UNHCR registrations - except for 
Malawi - are much lower than for total estimated refugees and UNHCR has 
no presence in South Africa. In that respect Mozambique - after 
consultation with the ANC - needs to approach UNHCR with a view to the 
latter's extending its returnee support/protection operation in South 
Africa to cover Southern African refugees in South Africa. Assisting 
them is consistent with special concern for the victims of apartheid
and would not appear to provide any support or credibility for the
present regime.
8. Surveys are being carried out by UNHCR in several countries and are 
needed in all six:
a . how many
b. age, gender distribution
c. home districts and pre-flight livelihoods
d. under what conditions wish to return where
e. willingness to wait one to three years to be able to enter full 
scale livelihood rehabilitation programme
f. support needed to re-establish themselves on return (in some 
detail).
This date is crucial to planning overall Reconstrucao levels and 
phasing. CPPs have no capacity to collect this data - only UNHCR 
and/or host governments do. Active Mozambican involvement in survey 
design is crucial if the information needed for effective livelihood 
rehabilitation support is to be secured. Mozambican participation 
(from Provincial directorates who will be involved in support 
programmes) in survey teams would be valuable to begin first hand 
contact and two way understanding.
9. The Malawian figures appear to be an overcount. Adding present
population of most affected districts (including the 300,000 or more
51988-91 returnados) and refugees in Malawi gives quite implausibly high 
totals. Two explanations are possible:
■ The Malawi state (which, unlike its people profits from the refugee
presence both on fiscal account and through holding down
agricultural wages) may be more efficient at adding new 
registrations than at deleting returned ones; and/or
■ Border area households may be double counted as returnados and
refugees if some household members farm and sometimes live in
Mozambique but some also live (at least part time) in Malawi and — 
quite reasonably - draw rations to assist in making ends meet until 
production is restored.
• 10. Zambian data are very imprecise because no estimate of the unregistered 
majority has been made there (unlike Zimbabwe and Tanzania which have 
both more inclusive registration and a working knowledge of non­
registered refugees living in/with related communities).
11. Swaziland residents from Mozambique probably exceed 50,000. However, 
many are semi skilled workers and small businessmen. While this makes 
Swaziland eager they return to Mozambique (to broaden opportunities for 
Swati), it also means they will not willingly do so until employment 
and real income prospects in Mozambique are more buoyant.
12. In the case of South Africa any figure is a guess. Residents who were 
born or lived for a significant period in Mozambique probably number
500,000 or more. But:
a. by no means all are refugees as opposed to immigrants including ex­
mine workers;
b. none are in a formal refugee context (either with UNHCR or the RSA 
government);
c. how many will wish to return to rehabilitate their Mozambican 
livelihoods when security improves and drought recedes can only be 
determined by a survey. That requires a UNHCR presence to 
guarantee taking part in the survey will not lead to deportation.
13. Any survey will be snapshot and one which may date rapidly.
6■ there have been substantial returnado flows (halted by drought but 
also slowed because those for whom return was easiest have in large 
part come); but
■ also substantial new refugee flows from shifts in security 
(including those who became able to flee when bandidos control was 
broken), failed attempts to return and - especially from Manica in 
1991 and all eight Southern and Central Provinces this year - 
drought.
Recent drought flight refugees may find return easier, as they often 
have communities to which to return, their areas have not - in general 
- been recent combat zones and there has not been time for their fields 
to go back to bush.
14. Many refugees will wish to return as soon as it appears practicable to 
them. Those living near old homes and/or with some land in refugee 
location to grow food and/or ability to send, are adult home to begin 
clearing and rebuilding while others are safe (and fed) in a camp are 
particularly likely to move on their own. A five year phased return 
peaking in the second year (Table 1) would optimal given personnel, 
institutional and finance constraints. How near this goal it will be 
possible to come is problematic.
15. Refugee population make-up by gender and age is unclear. References to 
"over 70%" or "up to 80%" women and children combined with statements 
that there are very few men are puzzling. About 50% of the people of 
Mozambique are 15 or younger (children) and 26% adult women suggesting 
76% women and children would constitute a normal population pattern. 
Many adult men have in fact led their families to refuge. A detailed 
population survey (especially of how many female headed households 
there are) is an important part of the broader refugee survey.
16. Mozambique needs to conduct a detailed security assessment (with 
refugee and Provincial input dominant). External agency definitions of 
security diverge both from those of Provincial authorities, from the 
evidence of private sector food haulage and from the numbers of 
returnados to districts UNHCR sees as characterised by total insecurity 
(most notably in Tete).
7III.
RETURN
17. The aspect in which livelihood rehabilitation for refugees is - in a 
majority of cases - substantially different from that for households 
now in Mozambique whose livelihoods have been wiped out by war is that 
of transportation home. In general refugees need to go further and 
require organised assistant unless they come from border districts and 
are now in adjacent border districts of their host countries.
18. This is an area in which UNHCR has a mandate, experience and 
willingness to mobilise funds/arrange transport. However, the need to 
integrate return with broader rehabilitation raises several issues of 
coordination.
19. Pre return dialogue and briefing needs to involve Mozambican 
Reconstrucao programme personnel from the Provinces to which they are 
returning.
20. Provinces and districts need to agree scheduling of arrivals with 
UNHCR. Stays in "arrival camps" should be minimised - place of abode 
as refugee direct to place of (self chosen) resettlement should, if at 
all possible, be the norm.
21. Provision of tools, seeds, household equipment and food should take 
place in home district and not in place of refuge. Further returnado 
and other households should receive the same support 'kits' and food 
supplies. (This is not standard UNHCR procedure and is the opposite of 
what they have tentatively proposed in respect to Mozambican refugees.)
IV.
RECONSTRUCAO
22. Once they have reached their home district (or other self chosen 
resettlement site) returnados should not be seen as radically different 
from desplacado, affectado, pauperised in place and demobilisado
households. On average they may well be slightly less badly off than
8the first three of those groups. But differences will in fact be far 
greater within than between groups.
23. From a community rebuilding/civil society strengthening perspective no 
general case exists for separate resettlement areas by group.
Recreating lost communities will in general be easier - and desired. 
Exceptions may well exist if most or all of a village fled together and 
maintained close links in exile - but that is likely to be the 
exception rather than the rule. This creates problems for UNHCR 
financial and personnel participation which will be addressed in a 
specific later section.
24. On arrival all returnados (transborder or domestic) face a similar 
challenge - recreating their livelihoods. They are not in the same 
position as poor sector familial households who have been able to 
maintain (or to regain) substantial production and have cleared fields, 
existing homes and last year's harvest to feed them until the new crop 
comes. They cannot respond to market incentives in the same way nor do 
they have the same initial capability to engage in self provisioning 
('subsistence'). Nor will these gaps close on their own. Programmes 
to enable these households to produce and to take part in civil society 
(including its economic, use of services and self organisation aspects) 
are essential if most are not to remain permanently absolutely poor.
25. Normal development strategies and especially normal macroeconomic 
management strategies and accounting projections have little to say 
about this type of context. Presumably it is seen as so abnormal as 
not to warrant consideration. But it is our reality in Mozambique and 
we cannot embark on a normal development strategy (not even our 
Priority District Programme) for more than a minority of our people 
until that reality is addressed and overcome.
26. To do so requires an interim Reconstrucao (or livelihood 
rehabilitation) strategy over at least seven years. It would serve as 
a bridge from Emergencia survival to Developmento. Mapping out the 
main elements of such an approach is quite feasible - especially for 
rural areas and sector familial households. They include:
a. allocation of sector familial farms on return home by refugees, 
dislocated and affected households;
9b. provision of basic working capital (tools to clear, to build and to 
till, plus basic household equipment seeds and where relevant 
fishing equipment and small stock) to returning households and to 
those pauperised in place with homes and working capital destroyed 
by the war and/or drought;
c. provision of food to these households for 9 to 15 months until they 
have a full harvest (or income from crops grown or fish caught to 
sell) to sustain them;
d. parallel 'reconstruction' of access to basic services - health, 
education, water, agricultural extension basically via government 
(provincial and district level) capacity enhancement with initially 
limited (by poverty) user contributions;
e. together with re-establishment of the rural/small town commercial 
network requiring loans to recapitalise rural oriented private and 
cooperative commercants (produce buyers-merchants-transporters) to 
provide effective market access and at least some competition for 
sector familial business;
f. as well as basic physical infrastructure reconstruction based on 
user assessment of priorities, district and provincial managed and 
focused on seasonal, labour intensive work employing sector 
familial household members to enhance their cash incomes to meet 
non-food needs and to reflate both real demand and real fiscal 
revenue;
g. in association with a demobilisation programme which - following an 
initial payment on turning in weapons and equipment - incorporates 
ex combatants and their dependents into the main rural livelihood 
rehabilitation strategy.
27. Certain macroeconomic policy approaches need revision (or provision of
supplementary parallel mechanism) for this strategy to be viable:
a. credit for reactivating capacity, facilitating the small, micro and 
artisanal enterprise sectors, and rehabilitating the rural 
commercial network cannot be provided within current bank credit 
ceilings which already prevent validation of produced output 
(notably in agriculture);
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b. requiring either new approaches (incorporating calculation of real 
floor levels required to allow enhanced real output as well as 
monetary ceilings to limit inflation) to credit ceiling calculation 
or/and new credit channels not counted as bank credit (even if 
commercial banks may be involved as agents);
c. expansion of basic service coverage (and, especially in the case of 
education, quality rehabilitation) and rehabilitation of public 
service salarios to minimum levels consistent with efficiency;
d. initially requiring additional as well as reallocated external 
finance (perhaps partly by selective reduction of provision of 
overseas personnel and training in favour of temporary, agreed 
public service salary enhancement for middle and high skill posts 
plus local joint venture training) to avoid reopening an 
inflationary domestic borrowing requirement.
These are modifications within PRE and PRES macroeconomic strategy - 
not an abandonment of that strategy. But they are crucial to 
stabilisation and price relativity adjustment costs being able to pay 
off in contributing to an enabling climate for enhanced production.
28. It also depends on revised perceptions by resource providers;
a. recognition that until livelihoods are rehabilitated the reduction 
of emergency survival support will mean destitution and even death 
but that shifting resources gradually from emergency to 
rehabilitation does provide a route back to development and, 
ultimately, to lower Mozambican net resource inflow requirements;
b. implying that Emergencia funding should be considered to be 
fungible at least to Reconstrucao;
c. while also recognising that the number of households needing 
assistance in livelihood rehabilitation (as well as the scarcity of 
middle level Mozambican support personnel and the total 
inappropriateness of expatriates beyond central and provincial 
coordination levels) requires simple, low unit cost per household 
served, swiftly beginning, broad coverage, expansible programmes 
which are, perhaps analogous to Emergencia but the exact opposite 
of most donor designed or redesigned rural development projects and
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especially of most new large scale agricultural enterprises or 
large scale (even if sector familial cropped) irrigation schemes;
d. and which are much harder to analyse with any precision or 
estimation of magnitude and timing of returns than - say - 
hydroelectric or major infrastructural projects;
e. requiring some reallocation from long pay off period, high capital 
cost per benefiting household projects especially in agriculture;
f. but that in the initial years of reconstrucao (and particularly in 
respect to demobilicao) net additional resources will be needed 
until benefit flows first balance and then exceed expenditure, 
especially because basic public service spending per capita and - 
implicitly - non-uniformed government employment are currently less 
than half those posited in the World Bank's Long Term Perspective 
Study which is, in a real sense, the foundation from and toward 
which Reconstrucao has been elaborated.
29. A series of significant institutional changes affecting donors as well
as the Government of Mozambique will be necessary:
a. redressing the imbalance under which 40% of non-military, non-debt 
service recurrent expenditure budgeting and disbursement but only 
about 4% of capital is now effectively decentralised to Provinces 
.- a shift affecting donor-Provincial, almost more than Ministry of 
Finance-Provincial, relations and requiring recapacitation of 
Provincial Planning Commissions;
b. operating Reconstrucao within a national strategic, macroeconomic
and coordination frame but with articulation, budgeting and
implementation dominantly at Provincial level (and, to the extent 
capacity makes this practicable, at District level);
c. negotiating Emergencia and Reconstrucao together to allow gradual
resource shifts former to the latter as well as coordinating
Reconstrucao and Development proper, initially to facilitate 
reallocations from the latter to the former;
d. creating a means to integrate UNDP and UNHCR support for livelihood 
rehabilitation for domestic and externally displaced persons into a
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single operational whole within the overall national strategy and 
Provincial articulation and operation, rather than arriving at 
three different programmes with different (and potentially 
significantly inconsistent) styles;
e. ensuring that demobilisation support includes not only initial 
allowances but also funding livelihood rehabilitation (rural and 
urban);
f. greater joint evaluation of recurrent and capital expenditure 
because a substantial portion of rehabilitacao/reconstrucao is on 
the borderline between the two while another large proportion is 
recurrent expenditure targeted toward creating an enabling climate 
for early output recovery;
g. avoiding creation of new parallel institutions and commissions - 
indeed where possible reducing present overlaps and tightening 
lines of accountability - while enhancing coordination primarily 
through more creative use of the work of the National Budget 
(Finance) and National Planning Directorates.
The foregoing review implies that while Reconstrucao should be an 
analytical and programming focus, including detailed Reconstrucao sub­
votes in - e.g. - Provincial primary health care or even agricultural 
extension and especially have separate sub-categories of personnel 
would rarely be necessary or even appropriate.
Rural Livelihood Rehabilitation: Numbers, Phasing, Costs
30. More detailed discussion appears in RECONSTRUCAO: The Road from
Emegencia to Developmento. Costings for the Rural Reconstrucao 
Programmes (few refugees are urban in pre-flight residence) appear at 
Table 2. Apart from the specific transport home item the portion 
attributable to refugee returnados is roughly 20% - their proportion of 
total households requiring livelihood rehabilitation. That implies a 
total of $332,500,000 ($222 per person or $1,550 per household) over 
five years.
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V.
COSTS AND FINANCE
31. Apart from initial return transport ($25 million) the returnado 
component of rehabilitacao can be separated nominally and 
allocationally but not in the sense of separate operational budgets. 
Even in the cases in which such separationally is nominally possible,
e.g. tools, seeds, household equipment which could be delivered to 
refugee households before return or at transit camps the division of 
purchases and duplication of logistics would both raise cost and reduce 
efficiency.
32. However, the conceptual allocation is relatively straightforward. 20% 
of people are expected to be refugees (slightly less than 20% of 
households because demobilisados - ex combatants - are on average 
younger and have smaller households). Therefore it is reasonable to 
attribute 20% of basic rehabilitaco costs - $307,500,000 to 
reintegration of refugees into the economy and civil society. This 
figure is potentially useful for mobilising funds and especially for 
securing a leading UNHCR role in that mobilisation effort.
33. The costs (see Table 2) are about 33% direct family re-establishment 
support, 16% small scale infrastructure rehabilitation, 28% basic 
services restoration and extension, 19% market revival (or marketing 
system recreation to enable households to participate in a reasonably 
competitive commercial network that collects and delivers goods in 
addition to transmitting 'market signals' reasonably accurately) and 5% 
associated costs including refugee return and overall planning and 
coordination.
34. In principle different weightings could be given to returnado use of 
each category, but what validity these would have or what purpose would 
be served is unclear. A better case can be made for year to year 
variations as refugees are likely to be less than 20% of total 
returnados in years 1 and 5. However, ex ante projections as to 
numbers will inevitably be uncertain throughout because of weather 
conditions (crucial to successful re-establishment) as well as - at 
least in the first year - security fluctuations.
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35. Funding projections (see Table 4) are no more - indeed rather less - 
divisible by category of households except in respect to UNHCR or 
bilateral funds pledged specifically in support of refugees/external 
returnados and analogous tied pledges in support of demobilisados.
35. Substantial sums should be available from reallocation - from 
Emergencia, military spending, large scale capital projects and 
technical assistance - if the will to do so can be generated and 
sustained. Similarly, if the Rehabilitacao programme is successful in 
enabling 1,100,000 households to produce more substantial Gross 
Domestic Product (see Table 4) gains should result with positive fiscal 
impact even during the five year programme period (see Table 3). 
However, all of these sources will take time to build up so that of a 
total financing requirement (rural and urban) of $1,973,000 million of 
which $214,000,000 will need to be general additional external finance 
$166,500,000 will be needed in the first year.
37. $414,000,000 special external finance for external returnados and 
demobilisados is needed over 5 years. Because returnado designated 
support probably cannot be expected to cover much of expenditure more 
than 12 to 15 months after return, the plausible target for refugee 
oriented mobilisation efforts is probably of the order of $230,000,000 
(see Table 3) rising from $40,000,000 in year one to $64,000,000 in 
year two before declining to $26,500,000 by year five. In fact this is 
not a net additional cost. Present international, host government and 
host community costs for ensuring the survival abroad of the 1,5000,000 
refugees are probably on the order of $100,000,000 a year so that the 
$229,500,000 over five years is not only a self terminating expenditure 
but one which is largely offset in early years and more than totally 
offset by the third years in savings from survival support costs.
38. The assumptions underlying the $229,500,000 figure are that UNHCR and 
bilateral contributors would provide external return travel, 20% of 
household rehabilitation and 10% of basic service and small scale rural 
infrastructure costs. The use of 10% instead of 20% and the exclusion 
of market rehabilitation costs is not based on logic. Rather it flows 
from the fact that refugee return programmes do not historically 
provide much support to these areas and the probability that UNHCR
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would find it very difficult to lengthen and extend its mandate in 
those directions.
VI.
UNHCR
39. UNHCR has planned a refugee return programme but one very different 
from the Rehabilitacao one sketched above. It envisages:
a. distribution of basic "kits" (rather narrower than those proposed) 
in host countries;
b. extensive use of transit camps;
c. payment of allowances (in food or cash) for 5 to 12 months;
d. rather limited indirect involvement in water and health service 
restoration in districts with very high proportions of returnados;
e. monitoring safety of returned refugees.
Notably absent are integration into any overall programme covering all 
households with war destroyed livelihoods or any major direct 
involvement in reconstruction activities.
40. While UNHCR proposals are in line with past refugee return programmes; 
they could be adapted to fit into overall livelihood rehabilitation 
within UNHCR's present legal mandate even if not within its normal 
operating procedures. To achieve that will require that the Government 
of Mozambique agrees on a strategy and makes articulated proposals to 
UNHCR (as well as UNDP, other international agencies and bilaterals) 
rapidly with preliminary consultations prior to the 1992 Consultative 
group meeting.
41. The basic thrust of the revised role for UNHCR would include:
a. external portion of return travel as before;
b. very limited use of transit camps;
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c. UNHCR personnel participation in Provincial and District teams led 
by Mozambican bodies;
d. channelling of UNHCR and related returnado funding into overall 
rehabilitation budgets on an agreed formula basis;
e. monitoring of success of reintegration (with less emphasis on 
safety which UNHCR has traditionally stressed because in many cases 
- but not Mozambique - refugees did flee from their own 
governments);
f. perhaps greater UNHCR personnel involvement in specific programme 
activities, but within Mozambican institutional frameworks and 
serving all programme participants not just returnados (while 
government and other agency personnel serve returnados as well as 
households from other groups).
VII.
UNDP
42. UNDP has also begun planning for returnados - apparently as an 
extension/conversion of its role as external coordinator and supporter 
of Emergencia. While it has coordinated with UNHCR, significant 
Mozambican participation (and certainly presentation of a Mozambican 
strategic framework) has been very limited.
43. UNDP clearly is a key support agency both in its won right and 
coordinator of other UN agencies and in its capacity as sponsor of 
external resource mobilisation for Reconstrucao to complement, take 
over from, ultimate end the need for the bulk of Emergencia. However, 
it has neither the remit nor the capacity to design an overall 
Reconstrucao strategy for Mozambique. That is primarily the undeniable 
and inescapable responsibility and prerogative of the Government of 
Mozambique.
44. To retrieve its leading role Mozambique needs to decide on a 
Reconstrucao strategy with main articulations and programme thrusts and 
enter into dialogue with UNDP, other UN Agencies - especially UNHCR,
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WFP, UNICEF and ILO - and major bilaterals. A broad body of materials 
has been prepared by DNP during 1992 but requires CPP and Cabineto 
adoption before such a dialogue can be fully fruitful - or before the 
parallel exercise of involving Mozambican institutions (especially at 
Provincial level) in data collection, design, organisation of capacity 
can be carried beyond present initial stages.
VIII.
WHERE NOW?
45. If Reconstrucao - the rehabilitation of the livelihoods of the majority 
of Mozambican households economically pauperised by war - is seen as a 
key priority then action on defining strategic parameters and on 
articulating programmes and institutional relationships has a high 
priority as to time as well as to importance.
46. The case is relatively straightforward:
a. the 1,000,000 households to be served (plus 100,000 demobilisado 
households) comprise about half of all Mozambicans in Mozambique 
and surviving as external deslocados;
b. without special enabling programmes most cannot rebuild their 
livelihoods and escape from absolute poverty;
c. programmes with plausible total costs and not unattainable 
financing patterns (see Tables 2 and 3) could substantially 
increase Gross Domestic Product (Table 4), food security (Table 5) 
and proportion of Mozambican households above the absolute poverty 
line (Table 6).
47. If this case - and the consequential overall Reconstrucao approach - 
are adopted then external deslocados households on return need to be 
integrated into area focused programmes carried out by existing 
Mozambican institutions with operational activities coordinated by CCPs 
and national coordination by DNP. That is a substantially different 
approach from past refugee return programmes in Southern Africa and 
from what UNHCR and UNDP now envisage.
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48. Therefore it is urgent to approve an articulated strategy to put to 
UNHCR, UNDP and other key external actors as a basis for dialogue and 
for financial mobilisation through the 1992 Consultative Group meeting 
and a joint UNHCR - Mozambique pledging conference on behalf of 
external returnados.
refret.doc/rhg/sh/lb/22.6.92
Table 1
Rural livelihood Rehabilitation 1993/4 — 1997/8
Numbers of Households1 and Possible Phasing
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
Refugees (Ext­
ernally Displaced)2 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Displaced (Int­
ernal Refugees) 40,000 70,000 50,000 40,000 15,000 215,000
Affected (Forced 
To Move3 100,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 30,000 430,000
Pauperised In 
Place"1 25,000 50,000 40,000 20,000 5,000 140,000
Demobilised
Ex-Combatants5 40,000 50,000 10,000 - - 100,000
Total5 245,000 390,000 250,000 150,000 65,000 1,100,000
Notes:
1. Average household size estimated at 7 persons except for ex-Combatants estimated at 5.
Approximately 55% children under 15, 25% adult women, 20% adult men. One household in
4 female headed.
2. Official UNHCR estimates of 1.3 million persons exclude non-registered refugees in 
Zambia and also Swaziland and South Africa. On the other hand, they overstate Malawi 
where registering new arrivals is prompt and efficient but deleting returnees is 
neither, understandably from a Malawian perspective.
3. Households not in camps (effective distinctive characteristic of deslocados) forced to 
move by war and neither incorporated in urban life nor satisfactorily resettled from 
their own perspective (Many of new Beira Corridor residents are satisfactorily 
resettled but relatively few elsewhere).
4. Living in or near ruins of homes but with total or near total loss of residences, 
seeds, tools, food stocks, livestock.
5. Rural background households (20,000 in urban reconstruction estimates for urban 
background households).
6. Phasing highly approximate. Constraints are drought, security, capacity of agencies 
and state to assist. Larger 1994/5 targets would be desirable but financial, personnel 
and institutional limitations would make them dangerous because unassisted returnees 
are likely to fail to re-establish themselves and to flee again or even — as has
happened - die.
Table 2
Rural Reconstruction: Toward Costing
(000 1991 Price $)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total13
A. Household Re­
establishment 117,500 187,500 122,500 77,500 36,500 540,000
Internal Transport1 
Food2
(12,500) 
(75,000)
(20,000)
(120,000)
(12,500)
(80,000)
(7,500) 
(50,000)
(3,000)
(25,000)
(55,000)
(350,000)
Tools/Seeds/House­
hold Equipment3 (25,000) (40,000) (25,000) (15,000) (6,000) (110,000)
Construction
Materials/
Simple Equipment'1 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
B. Physical Infra­
structure Rehabil- 
itation5* 25,000 50,000 75,000 50,000 50,000 250,000
C. Basic Service Rest-
oration/Extension6 50,000 75,000 125,000 125,000 75,000 450,000
D. Market Revival 32,500 55,000 67,500 97,500 37,500 300,000
Retail Enterprise 
Infrastructure 
(Vehicles/Working 
Capital)7 (25,000) (50,000) (50,000) (75,000) (25,000) (225,000)
Ditto Wholesale 
Enterprise8 (5,000) (10,000) (10,000) (15,000) (10,000) (50,000)
Associated Public 
Infrastructure9 (2,500) (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (25,000)
E. Associated Items 19,000 26,250 14,750 7,500 5,000 72,500
Refugee Return10 (5,000) (7,500) (5,000) (5,000) (2,500) (25,000)
Demobilisation
Allowances11 (9,000) (11,250) (2,250) - - (22,500)
Planning/Coordination 
(DNP, CCPs, Prov.
Works)12 (5,000) (7,500) (7,500) (2,500) (2,500) (25,000)
TOTAL 244,000 303,750 404,750 357,500 304,000 1,612,500
Notes:
1. From present location to home area. $50/household.
2. 9 to 15 months to first main crop. $300-325/household including transport.
3. Tools to clear and till land and to rebuild home, tools, small stock, fishing
equipment, seeds, basic household equipment - e.g. water pails. $100/household 
including transport.
4. Beams, poles, bricks, carpentry tools, block making machines, cement. Say $1,000 per 
village of 400 households.
5. Roads, culverts, ditches, small scale irrigation, ponds, other public buildings.
Rough breakdown:
Wages Seasonal Local Labour 125,000,000
Other Wages and Salaries 25,000,000
Hand Tools 10,000,000
Other Equipment 25,000,000
Construction Inputs (Pipe/Pumps/
Bitumen/Cement/Wood/etc.) 65,000,000
6. Primary Health, Education, Agricultural Extension, Water.
Rough breakdown:
Wages, Salaries, Training 150,000,000
Operating Materials (Drugs/
Texts/Chalk/etc.) 100,000,000
Equipment (Blackboards, Furniture,
Vehicles, etc.) 75,000,000
Buildings, Other Fixed Plant 100,000,000
(Rural service expansion/rehabilitation recurrent and capital cumulative over five 
years.)
7. Loans to 2,500 newly re-established rural merchants/transporters at $40,000 each - 
lorry, stock in trade finance. Loans to 500-750 co-operatives (expansion of capital 
base or new activity) at comparable capital input. $100 million subsequent finance 
(loan) of vehicle-warehouse-working capital expansion in addition to reinvested 
enterprise earnings.
8. Analogous to Note 7 for wholesale sector-private enterprises, co-ops and (as guarantor 
of minimum prices and of competition) Agricon.
9. Warehouses, markets, selected medium scale works.
10. $100-125 per person. Presumptively UNHCR financed. Subsequent expenses for refugees
incorporated in main programme heads. About 20% of totals.
11. Initial allowance of $150 per person at time of turning in gun and equipment. Plus 50%
addition for 'surplus' guns from Mozambique or South Africa turned in. Subsequent 
expenses incorporated in main programme heads (about 9% of totals).
12. Training, equipment, staff gap filling in coordination units - DNP, Provincial Planning 
Directorates - and crucial operating units especially Provincial Works Directorates 
(engineers, draughtsmen, artisans, foremen) to design/operate small fixed capital unit 
components of programme.
13. Rounded especially in "A" so line totals may not add exactly.
Table 3
( $000 1991 Prices)
Category 1993/4 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 Total
A. Reallocation1 40,000 190,000 290,000 345,000 325,000 1,190,000
From Emergencia2 - (50,000) (125,000) (200,000) (200,000) (575,000)
From Large 
Capital Projects3 (25,000) (100,000) (100,000) (75,000) (50,000) (350,000)
From Technical 
Assistance'1 (5,000) (10,000) (15,000) (20,000) (25,000) (75,000)
From Military 
ExpenditureH (10,000) (30,000) (50,000) (50,000) (50,000) (190,000)
From Other Recurrent*5 NA NA NA NA NA ( - )
B. Special 79,500 121,500 95,000 73,500 44,500 414,000
Refugees7
Demobilisation0
(40,000) 
(39,500)
(64,000) 
(57,500)
(56.500)
(38.500)
(42,500) 
(31,000)
(26,500)
(18,000)
229.500
184.500
C. Domestic 1,000 8,000 21,000 45,000 80,000 155,000
Fiscal Gain From 
Programme9 ( ~ ) (5,000) (15,000) (35,000) (65,000) (120,000)
User Contributions 10 (1,000) (3,000) (5,000) (10,000) (15,000) (35,000)
D. Sub-total1 120,500 319,500 406,000 463,500 449,500 1,759,000
E. Additional
External Flow 
Needed11 166,500 46,500 84,000 (14,500) (69,250) 214,000
TOTAL12 287,750 366,000 490,000 449,000 380,250 1,973,000
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Reallocation from 1991/2 levels of expenditure. In 1991/2 prices except for minimum 
salario rise to $40. Does not include reduction of UNHCR, host government, local 
community contribution to refugees which now probably exceeds $250,000,000 a year.
Excludes additional (to 1991/2 based) drought related costs.
Existing projects and successors. Assumes some new large capital intensive projects 
late in period with shift to developmento. Excludes new enterprise related, 
financially and externally self-liguidating enterprise investment, e.g. natural gas 
export, electricity production/transmission linked to exports (South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland) and to direct import substitution (Maputo).
4. Substitution of domestic training (in this programme) for overseas training and of 
support for qualified Mozambican for provision of expatriates.
5. Wages, arms, vehicles, equipment, ammunition, fuel, spares, rations. Calculations 
speculative until trend of security makes possible detailed military spending reduction 
programme.
6. Total non Reconstrucao Recurrent spending is too low to provide basic minima of 
governance, services. Savings on some heads will be needed for increases on others.
7. UNHCR plus bilateral donors with peace promotion linked aid programmes (e.g. Japan). 
Calculated at external travel plus 20% of household rehabilitation and 10% of related 
service and infrastructure costs set out in Table 2. Refugees are 20% of total 
households covered.
8. Separate funding from bilaterals specifically concerned with restoration of peace, e.g. 
Switzerland, Italy Japan. Includes direct demob payment plus 9% rural household plus 
related services/infrastructure costs from Table 2. Demobilised households are 
estimated at 9% of all covered. Table 3 programme for domobilisados includes year's 
interim employment plus retraining.
9. Roughly estimated at 20% of programme generated additions to commercialised Gross 
Domestic Production. See Table 5 for fuller estimation for 1998/99.
10. Very rough estimate. Includes labour, materials, food as well as cash contributions.
11. Requirement for grants, very soft loans or reductions in actual external debt service 
payments (excluding arrears write-off or non-serviceable portion of amounts nominally 
due). Numbers in ( ) are negative (i.e. reduction in external resource transfer 
requirement).
12. Equal To Costs from Tables 2, 3.
Table 4
1998/99 Reconstrucao GDP Impact 
($000 at 1991 prices)
A. Additional Rural GDP Related To Reconstrucao
1 . Sector Familial1 Provisioning Sold Total
(Programme Households)
■ Food (including animals, fish)2
■ Non-Food Crops (including
Forest Products)3
■ Artisanal Products'1
■ Home Farm Construction5
■ Basic Services In Kind5
■ Wages From Infrastructure
Rehabilitation 7
185,000
5.000
35.000
55.000
5.000
65.000
100,000
15.000
25.000
250.00
105.000
50.000
55.000 
5,000
25.000
TOTAL 285,000 205,000 490,000
Per Household ($)° $260 $190 $450
Rural Absolute Poverty Line9 $470 - $520
2. Sector Familial10 30,000 20,000 50,000
(Other Households)
Wages Other Value Added Total
3. Public Services11 30,000v 10,000 40,000
a) Basic Services
b) Infrastructure Rehabilitation
30,000 
( 7 ) 10,000
30.000
10.000
4. Commerce/Transport11' 13
a) Commerce12
b) Transport13
All Sold 107,500 
60,000 
47,500
5. Multiplier Effect15 Not Estimated 
TOTAL Reconstrucao Augmentation
To Rural GDP36 687,500 
Of Which Household Self Provisioning (315,000)
B. Additional Urban GDP Related To Reconstrucao
Provisioning Sold Total
1 . Enterprise Added In Sales To:11 - 175,000 175,000
■ Rural Sector Familial
■ Commerce/Transport
■ Micro-Small Industry
■ Urban Sector Familial
■ Public Service Wage Earners
■ Exports
-
(90.000)
(40.000)
(15.000)
(7.500)
(7.500)
(15.000)
(90.000)
(40.000)
(15.000)
(7.500)
(7.500)
(15.000)
2. Urban Sector Familial ("Informal") 2,000 12,000 14,000
Agriculture (Zonas Verdes)13 
Artisanal
(1,000)
(1,000)
(7.000)
(5.000)
(8,000)
(6,000)
3. Public Services 1,500 13,500 15,000
■ Basic Services
■ Infrastructure
(1,500)19 
( - )
(7,500)
(6,000)
(4.000)
(6.000)
4. TOTAL Direct Impact 3,500 201,500 205.000
5. Multiplier (25%)2° - 50,000 50,000
TOTAL — Urban GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao21 3, 500______251, 500______255, 000
TOTAL - GDP Increase
Related To Reconstrucao16' 2X' 22 318,500 624,000 942,500
Notes:
1. Production for sale and household self-provisioning by the 1,100,000 households 
included in programme. Gross. Some households have low levels of present output not
transferable on relocation. However, as this affects only 425,000 deslocado households
and their production is (as valued) perhaps $100 per household the difference is under
10%. All items valued at value added level.
2. Estimate 2,750,000 tonnes grain equivalent food of which 2,000,000 consumed by
producers and 750,000 tonnes sold. Value at $100/tonne farmgate less $9.33/tonne 
purchased new labour inputs ($25,000,000 total purchases). Relatively low as grain 
equivalent tonne of vegetables, fruits, livestock, fish fetches substantially more.
(In the other crops cases also weighs substantially more.)
3. Includes both inputs into domestic industry and exports as well as household self­
provisioning (especially in fuel). Probable leading crops cotton, cashew.
4. Furniture, clothing, metal products, etc. Assumed purchased input content $10 million.
5. Assumed 1,100,000 homes lasting five years at value of $250. No estimate of land 
improvements, tree crop stands, additions to livestock herds made.
6. Largely labour for construction materials, food, furnishings.
7. Labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation as cited in Table 2.
8. Relates to 1,100,000 households in programme.
9. Rough Estimation/Family of 7:
Urban Rural
Food $500 $225 1 '>
Housing 100 50 2 - >
Transport/Water
Fuel 75 25 3 - ’
Other Goods/Services 175 220 5 (170) ’
Total $850______________ $520 (470)
1_> Farmgate prices plus limited purchases.
2 ( Maintenance/Rebuilding Cost Valuation
,_> Fuel perhaps $2.5 and Water $5 on basis rural prices/User
Fees in kind and cash. Commuter transport urban phenomenon. 
* ' ’ Same basket - urban prices plus 25%.
6 ’ Altered basket relating artisanal to product for household
use and different tastes.
10. The physical infrastructure and commercial network rehabilitation plus immediate (e.g. 
time saved) benefits of basic services rehabilitation will enable output/income 
increases in other sector familial households as will enhanced provision of 
agricultural extension services. Roughly estimated as equal to 10% of programme 
households' gains. On 30,000 present households that is $170 per household.
11. Rough estimates based on Sector Familial sales/purchases. Value added basis.
12. 10% sales plus 15% purchases.
13. 10% sales plus 10% purchases.
14. Sales (Market Prices - including inputs plus value added)
Food/Other Crops 204.5 million
Artisanal Products 19.5 "
224.)
Purchases
Sales 224 million
Infrastructure Wages 25 "
249 "
15. Presumably some multiplier can be expected. However, because basic rural purchases 
from the rural sector familial are relatively low (perhaps $35 to $40 million) the 
multiplier effect would be very low. Would tend to be partial offset of overestimation 
cited in Note 1.
16. Rural GDP will also rise from non-Reconstrucao Cotton Authority, Cashew Authority, 
Commercial Farmer and provision of competent training/extension to Irrigation schemes. 
This could amount to $20 to $25 million on food crops and $25 to $50 Million on non­
food crops at value added level and $50 to $87§ million at sales level. If 1,500,000 
rural households in 1998/9 that is $30 to $50 per household.
17. Assumptions:
a. Additional gross sales to rural sector equal additional sector familial purchases 
plus Commerce/Transport value added, less $40 million rural-rural.
b. Sales to Micro-Small Industry equal wages plus one half other sectoral value added. 
Sales to commercialised Zonas Verdes and to the artisanalsector = value added. 
(Wages = 25,000 X $600 = $15,000,000; Artisanal Value Added 10,000 X $500 = 
$5,000,000; Zonas Verdes commercialised Value Added $7,000,000; Other Value added 
$2 0 ,0 0 0,0 0 0.)
c. Sales to public service wage earners equal wages ($12,500,000).
d. Rural sales reduced by 3 3 V 3% for transport/rural commerce content; urban by 5% for 
inputs into urban transport/commerce.
e. Value added estimated at 65% of (a + b) reduced by c. Allows 20% operating and 
spares imports, 2|% purchases from rural sector, 12|% taxes (actual collection of 
turnover taxes licenses not nominal amount due).
f. Guesstimate of $25 million exports (fob) at 60% value added. The GDP here is value 
added in all urban sectors including commerce, transport and other 
enterprise/household produced services.
18. Assumes small urban infrastructure (e.g. drainage, small scale irrigation, roads, 
canisa site and service plot preparation, latrines) and time saving from closer water 
and health services empowers increase of 10,000 tonnes self—provisioning food 
($100/tonne) and 25,000 tonnes commercialised food ($200/tonne) plus $2 million fuel, 
building materials, other non-food crops.
19. User contribution in labour, food, materials to service cost. (Cash payments assumed 
to be $6 million.)
20. This is a relatively low estimate because first round on wage incomes has already been 
taken into account.
21. Does not include large enterprise, Urban Rehabilitation and other Heavy Infrastructure 
(e.g. Railways and Ports) projects not within Reconstrucao.
22. Not directly comparable to present GDP estimates. These seriously underestimate 
current price GDP by using massively too low domestic price levels and inflation rates 
and very incomplete coverage of co-op, informal and private enterprise commercial 
agriculture and of small scale and artisanal urban production of goods and services 
which are only partly offset by massive overestimation of households self-provisioning 
(subsistence) agricultural output.
Table 5
Food (im) Balance - Reconstrucao Impact
(000 tonnes grain equivalent)
1990/91 1988/89
Population In Mozambique1 12,500,000 18,250,000
Food Requirement^ 4,500,000 (100%) 6,570,000 (100%)
Domestic Production3 2,750,000 (61%) 5,710,000 (87%)
Urban (Zonas Verdes) (150,000) (3%) (185,000) (1%)
Household Consumed 
Commercialised 
Rural
(50,000) 
(100,000) 
(2,600,000)
(1%)
(2%)
(57%)
(60,000) (-) 
(125,000) (1%) 
(5,525,000) (84%)
Household Consumed 
Commercialised"1 
Imports53
(2,200,000)
(400,000)
625,00
(48%)
(9%)
(14%)
(4.400.000) (73%)
(1.225.000) (11%) 
400,000 (6%)
Food Aid
Commercial/Parallel
(500.000)
(125.000)
(11%)
(2%)
(200.000) (3%)
(200.000) (3%)
Food Deficit 1,125,000 (25%) 460,000 (7%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown5 Urban Rural Urban Rural
Population In
Mozambique 3 ,000,000 9,500,000 4,500,000 13,750,000
Food Requirement6 1 ,080,000 3,420,000 1,620,000 4,950,000
Domestic Production 500,000 2,250,000 1,085,000 4,625,000
Urban
Rural
(150.000)
(350.000)
( - ) 
(2,250,000)
(185.000)
(900.000)
( - ) 
(4,625,000)
Household Consumed (50,000) (2,200,000) (60,000) (4,300,000)
Commercialised
Imports5
(450,000)
400,000
(50,000)
225,000
(1,025,000)
375,000
(325,000)
25,000
Food Deficit3 ' 7 180,000 
(17%)
945,000
(27%)
160,000
(10%)
300,000
(6%)
Notes:
1. The official United Nations/Government of Mozambique projection of 16,000,000 
is clearly wrong. Subtractions include 1,500,000 refugees and 1,000,000 excess 
deaths resulting from war. Preliminary data in 1991 suggested a total 
population of 12,500,000. 1988/89 assumes return of 1,500,000 refugees plus a 
30% increase on the base population of 14,000,000, or about 3% a year.
2. Production level required assumed to be 360 kilos grain equivalent per year 
based on 800 grammes per day consumption requirement adjusted to allow for 20% 
loss from harvest (or import) to consumption.
3. This figure is not a complete estimate. Additions resulting from programmes by
government and enterprises outside Reconstrucao (e.g. competent training and 
extension in both large and small scale irrigation areas, commercial farm food 
output expansion) are not included. These could amount to perhaps 200,000 to
250,000 tonnes reducing the deficit by half to 3% to 4% of total requirement.
That does not mean only 3% to 4% of households (7% on Table 8 figures) have
less than fully adequate food supplies because of inequality in distribution. •
However, it should more than halve severe malnutrition from over 20% to 8% to 
10%.
Estimates include all marketed output-local trade, private, co-op not only 
officially recorded flows.
1990/91 may understate commercial imports via informal (legal apart from 
customs/turnover tax evasion) imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi.
Assumes Urban population 4,500,000 in 1988/89 and Rural 13,750,000. Implicit 
urban population growth rate 7%.
1990/91 deficit levels are plausible given known malnutrition data. 1989/90 
estimate of slightly poorer urban than rural nutrition are not implausible;
e.g. they probably parallel actual Tanzanian reality. They parallel estimates 
in Table 9 suggesting slightly higher proportions of absolute poverty (not 
numbers of absolutely poor people) in urban than in rural areas. Again this 
appears congruent with the present situation in Tanzania because while average 
urban household income is higher so too is inequality in food consumption and 
income. However, both differences are clearly within the margins of error of 
the projections.
Table 6
Absolute Poverty Reduction From Reconstrucao
Category1
Urban'
Related To Low Wages 
Related To Low Labour 
Power of Household 
plus Unemployment4
Rural
Of Livelihood Rehab- 
iliation Programme 
Households5 
Of Other Households6
1990/91 1998/99
50%
(20%)
27 |% 
(5%)
(30%)
71%
(2 2 |%) 
22 |%
(90%)
(30%)
(25%)
(20%)
TOTAL2 65% 24%
Notes:
1. See Table 5 - Note 9 for Absolute Poverty Line Estimates.
2. The percentages are of total urban absolutely poor households not of 
sub-population groups absolute poverty percentages.
3. Reduction from raising minimum real salario to $40 (at or approaching 
minimum efficiency level).
4. Reduction from retraining; higher productivity employment in "informal" 
as well as recorded sector; higher productivity employment artisanal, 
Zonas Verdes producers plus reduction in open unemployment (about 4% of 
potentially economically active persons in 1991).
5. See Table 5 - Section A and Note 9. Average income is perhaps 10% 
below absolute poverty line. This implies 20% to 30% of households 
would be below it depending on household income inequality.
6. Benefits from spin-off GDP impact noted in Table 5 - Section B and Note
10. Likely to be reduced further by rural output increases not related 
to Reconstrucao.
7. Because of parallel non-Reconstrucao generated economic recovery - both 
urban and rural - the actual 1989/90 absolute poverty outcome should be 
marginally to modestly better than these projections.
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